



Building impartial electoral management? Institutional design, independence and electoral integrity

International Political Science Review

2019, Vol. 40(3) 313–334

© The Author(s) 2019

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0192512119834573

journals.sagepub.com/home/ips**Carolien van Ham** 

Radboud University, The Netherlands

Holly Ann Garnett 

Royal Military College of Canada, Canada

Abstract

Electoral integrity is a persistent concern in both established and transitional democracies. Independent Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) have been championed as a key institutional reform measure to strengthen electoral integrity and are now the most common model of electoral management worldwide. Yet, empirical research has found conflicting evidence on the link between formal EMB independence and electoral integrity. We argue that conflicting findings might be driven by the lack of detailed data on EMB institutional design, with most studies using rudimentary classifications of ‘independent’, ‘governmental’ and ‘mixed’ EMBs, without addressing specific dimensions of EMB formal independence such as appointment procedures, budgetary control and formal competences. In this paper we analyse new detailed data on EMB institutional design in 72 countries around the world, develop a more detailed typology of dimensions of de jure EMB independence, and demonstrate how de jure EMB independence affects de facto EMB independence and electoral integrity.

Keywords

Election management, election management bodies (EMBs), electoral integrity, EMB institutional design, EMB independence

Introduction

Problems with electoral integrity are of increasing concern in both established and transitional democracies. Consequently, the role of electoral management in safeguarding electoral integrity is increasingly scrutinized. The 2000 and 2016 presidential elections in the United States sparked a debate on the need for improving electoral management and strengthening citizen trust in elections

Corresponding author:

Carolien van Ham, Professor of Empirical Political Science (as of August 2019), Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen 6525 XZ, The Netherlands.

Email: C.vanHam@fm.ru.nl

(Alvarez et al., 2008, 2012; Bowler et al., 2015). In Europe, electoral management failures in Britain and Ireland have also drawn increased attention (Buckley and Reidy, 2015; Clark, 2015; Farrell, 2015; James, 2017). In emerging democracies too, particularly in Latin America and Africa, electoral management bodies are often faulted for problems with election integrity and seen to play a key role in shaping voters' and elites' perceptions of election integrity (Kerr, 2014; Otaola, 2017; Rosas, 2010).

In an attempt to address these challenges, independent election management bodies (EMBs) have been championed as a key institutional reform measure to strengthen electoral integrity. In fact, independent EMBs are now the most common institutional model for electoral management in the world (Catt et al., 2014; López-Pintor, 2000; Wall et al., 2006).

Yet despite the widespread assumption that independent electoral management bodies will be better at their tasks of organizing, monitoring and certifying elections in an impartial manner, research has found conflicting evidence on the link between formal EMB independence and electoral integrity. While regional studies have found a positive impact of independent EMBs on electoral integrity in Latin America and Africa (Fall et al., 2011, Hartlyn et al., 2008), global comparative studies suggest that EMB institutional design is either negatively, or only very weakly, related to electoral integrity (Birch, 2011; Birch and van Ham, 2017; Norris, 2015).

These conflicting findings may be driven by the lack of detailed comparative data on EMB institutional design. Most studies use rudimentary classifications of 'independent', 'governmental' and 'mixed' EMB designs (Catt et al., 2014; López-Pintor, 2000; Wall et al., 2006), without addressing more specific aspects of EMB institutional design such as appointment procedures, budgetary control, and formal competences that may shape EMB independence. In addition to data limitations, conflicting findings may also be driven by differences in how scholars operationalize EMB independence, with some studies focusing on formal or *de jure* EMB independence while others emphasize *de facto* EMB independence (or conflate the two).¹ Moreover, the causal connections between institutional design, *de jure* and *de facto* institutional independence are likely to be quite complex. Disentangling these causal links may generate more precise insights into if and how EMB independence affects electoral integrity.

In this article we therefore address the following research questions:

1. What differences in EMB institutional design exist that shape EMB *de jure* independence?
2. How does variation in EMB *de jure* independence affect EMB *de facto* independence?
3. How does variation in EMB *de jure* and *de facto* independence affect electoral integrity?

To answer these questions, we present the results of a survey of the organizational structure of 72 electoral management bodies around the world collected in 2016 and 2017 and develop a detailed typology of the dimensions of EMB institutional design that shape *de jure* EMB independence. We subsequently demonstrate how *de jure* EMB independence affects *de facto* EMB independence, and ultimately electoral integrity.

The next section reviews existing research on EMB independence and electoral integrity. The third section presents our theoretical framework, and the fourth presents four dimensions of *de jure* EMB independence. In the fifth section we discuss the data and methods used. The results and conclusion are presented in the final sections.

EMB independence and electoral integrity

Following the introduction to this special issue, we define EMBs as the organization(s) that are tasked with 'managing some or all the elements that are essential for the conduct of elections' (Catt et al., 2014: 5). This includes determining voter and candidate eligibility, conducting polling, and

counting and validating votes; but may also include boundary delimitation, voter and candidate registration, campaign media and finance monitoring, voter education, and post-election dispute adjudication (Elklit and Reynolds, 2005).

As the key organizations responsible for organizing, monitoring and certifying elections, EMBs play an important role in ensuring a level playing field for parties and candidates competing in elections, in providing equal access to all eligible citizens to vote, and in ensuring that all participants (parties, candidates and citizens) perceive the electoral process and its outcome as legitimate (Elklit and Reynolds, 2001, 2005). Consequently, EMBs may be attractive targets for actors seeking to manipulate elections (Birch, 2011; Schedler, 2002). EMB independence is thought to insulate EMBs from political control and thereby protect them from partisan manipulation (Birch and van Ham, 2017).

For this reason, early research on EMB design often focused on their formal (*de jure*) independence from the government. Wall et al. (2006), building on López-Pintor (2000), developed a classification identifying three major types of EMB: independent, governmental and mixed. The independent model includes EMBs that are fully independent agencies, not accountable to the executive branch of government: the Mexican National Electoral Institute is an example. Governmental EMBs, conversely, run elections through a government ministry at the national or local level, such as the Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Interior in Denmark. Finally, the mixed model combines elements of both governmental and independent models. Often a government ministry will perform the day-to-day tasks of running the election, but there is significant oversight by an independent agency.

Several global comparative studies have used this tri-classification to test the impact of EMB independence on electoral integrity, with mixed results. Birch (2011) found a negative effect of EMB independence on electoral malpractice, while Norris (2015) and Birch and van Ham (2017) find no significant effects of EMB independence on electoral integrity. Yet, case study research and regional comparative studies appear to indicate that EMB independence does matter for electoral integrity. Hartlyn et al. (2008) demonstrate that independent EMBs increased the quality of presidential elections from 1980 to 2004 in 19 regimes in Latin America, and Gazibo (2006) and Trebilcock and Chitalkar (2009) discuss case studies in Africa and Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East that illustrate how crucial independent EMBs are for safeguarding electoral integrity.

The reasons for these diverging empirical findings may be threefold. First, detailed comparative data on EMB institutional design – and especially those dimensions of institutional design that might shape formal EMB independence, such as appointment procedures, budgetary control and formal competences – is scarce. Consequently, global comparative studies tend to use the rudimentary tri-classification presented above, with largely null-findings as a result. In contrast, regional comparative studies and case studies on EMBs often collect more detailed data on EMB institutional design, such as the term length and selection of EMB board members, the basis on which they are chosen (professional or partisan), or the composition of the EMB board as a whole (Hartlyn et al., 2008; Rosas, 2010). The positive effects of EMB independence on electoral integrity found by these studies suggests that more detailed measures of formal EMB independence may indeed generate more precise insights into which dimensions of EMB institutional design are key to promoting electoral integrity.

Second, conflicting findings may also be due to the fact that the impact of formal EMB independence on electoral integrity is contingent on the context in which elections take place. Indeed, van Ham and Lindberg (2015) demonstrate that in partly free and not free regimes, formal EMB independence strengthens electoral integrity.

Third, diverging findings might also be driven by whether empirical measures focus on *de jure* or *de facto* EMB independence. Scholars and practitioners emphasize that the correlation between these two measures may be tenuous, with EMB *de facto* independence likely being shaped by a variety of other factors, apart from its formal institutional structure (Catt et al., 2014; Elklit and

Reynolds, 2001; Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002, Mozaffar, 2002).² Indeed, Hartlyn et al. (2008) find a strong positive effect of de facto professional, non-partisan electoral commissions on election quality, while finding weaker evidence for a positive effect of formal-legal independence. Likewise, Birch and van Ham (2017) find that while formal EMB independence does not significantly affect electoral integrity, de facto EMB independence has a strong, positive and significant effect on electoral integrity. As de facto EMB independence is likely to affect electoral integrity more directly (i.e. it is more proximate in the causal chain, see the next section), these findings should not come as a surprise. However, as the regional comparative studies and case studies include measures of de facto EMB independence more often, this may explain diverging findings too. Clearly, in order to evaluate if and how EMB independence affects electoral integrity, disentangling the causal chain connecting EMB institutional design, EMB de jure independence and EMB de facto independence is crucial.

EMB institutional design, de jure independence and de facto independence

In the introduction to this special issue, we distinguish seven dimensions of EMB institutional design, one of which is the formal independence of EMBs. In line with the conceptual framework presented in the introduction, we expect EMB institutional design to shape EMB performance. Therefore, we expect formal or de jure EMB independence to shape de facto EMB independence, and de facto EMB independence to strengthen electoral integrity.³

Of course, at each step of this causal chain there are likely to be mitigating factors that strengthen or weaken the link between de jure and de facto EMB independence, and the link between de facto EMB independence and electoral integrity, respectively. First, as noted above, de jure EMB independence does not automatically translate into de facto EMB independence. Rather, contextual factors such as the level of democracy, the rule of law, and the presence of institutional checks and balances are likely to affect the degree that EMBs can operate independently in practice (Norris, 2015; van Ham and Lindberg, 2015). In addition, de facto EMB independence might also be affected by other dimensions of EMB organizational design, such as capacity and personnel (Herron et al., 2017; Norris, 2015; van Ham and Lindberg, 2015). Finally, the link between de facto EMB independence and electoral integrity is mediated by other factors shaping electoral integrity, such as the presence of free media, civil society and election observers (Birch, 2011; Lehoucq, 2003; Norris, 2015). In our empirical analyses, we account for these mitigating factors by including control variables where these are available.

This article focuses on uncovering which aspects of EMB institutional design define EMB de jure independence, and how this variation in de jure EMB independence affects EMB de facto independence and, ultimately, electoral integrity.

Dimensions of EMB de jure independence

What features of EMBs institutional design shape EMB de jure independence? The literature on non-majoritarian institutions and independent regulatory agencies provides guidance on what dimensions to look for when measuring EMBs formal independence from politics (Gilardi and Maggetti, 2011; Hanretty and Koop, 2013). When formally independent, EMBs can be considered a special type of non-majoritarian institutions as they regulate the most political of bureaucratic processes: the process that decides who will govern. Building on this literature, van Aaken (2009) distinguishes four dimensions of EMB independence: institutional, personnel, financial and functional independence, which we further develop here. Table 1 provides an overview of these dimensions of formal EMB independence and the indicators that can be used to measure them.⁴

Table 1. Mapping dimensions of formal EMB independence.

Dimensions of EMB de jure independence	Indicators
Institutional independence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EMB independence from politics formally stated in electoral laws or constitution? • EMB decisions can be overturned, and if yes, by whom? • EMB accountable to whom?
Personnel independence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who selects EMB members? • EMB members selected based on expertise or partisanship or both? • Term length of EMB members? • Can EMB members be reappointed? • Can EMB members be removed, and if so, by whom? • Protection against arbitrary removal? • Provisions compatibility with other public offices?
Financial independence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How is EMB budget allocated? • Who allocates EMB budget? • EMB control over budget? • EMB control over internal organization and staff?
Functional independence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scope of competences delegated to EMB? • How many other organizations involved in organizing, monitoring and certifying elections?

Institutional independence

Institutional independence refers to an EMB's formal-legal independence from politics as specified in the electoral law, the laws establishing and governing the EMB, or the constitution. It also refers to whether EMB decisions can be overturned, and if so, by whom; as well as whether the EMB is accountable for the implementation of its mandate, and if so, to whom.⁵ We expect that de facto EMB independence will be higher if EMB formal-legal independence is specified in law, if EMB decisions can either not be overturned at all, or only overturned by actors that are relatively removed from politics such as courts, and if the EMB is not accountable to the executive for the implementation of its mandate.

Personnel independence

Personnel independence refers to the selection and appointment procedures, term length and dismissal procedures of the key people in charge of the EMB: the EMB president/chair and EMB board members.

First, there is variation in who selects and appoints EMB members, whether this is the leader of government, another branch of government, such as the courts, or even the legislature. It is often suggested that appointment of EMB members by the legislature, rather than the executive, will be more independent, but as Estévez et al. (2008) and Hanretty and Koop (2013) argue, in parliamentary systems where the government has a legislative majority there is no reason why this should be the case. Rather, we hypothesize that EMB members selected by actors that are further away from the electoral process (meaning their political survival does not depend on the elections these EMB members will oversee) are likely to be more impartial in practice (Hartlyn et al., 2008; van Aaken, 2009). In addition, Hartlyn et al. (2008) argue that the *number* of actors involved in appointments should also make a difference, with 'autonomy increasing as agencies are named through processes involving multiple branches of government' (Hartlyn et al., 2008: 80).

Another important distinction regarding EMB member selection is the basis on which they are selected. EMB members may be selected based on professional qualifications or may be notable public figures. Conversely, EMB members can also be selected by political parties, allowing for representation on the election management board by each party contesting the election. The jury is still out on how the inclusion of partisan officials in EMBs affects electoral integrity. On the one hand, partisan representation may be an important way to ensure ‘buy-in’ from all parties competing in the election; on the other hand, it may discourage citizen confidence in the process if the same political forces competing in the election are involved in its administration (Estévez et al., 2008; Hartlyn et al., 2008; Pastor, 1999; van Aaken, 2009). Empirical evidence for the effect of non-partisan versus partisan EMB boards remains mixed: Ugues Jr. (2014) and Hartlyn et al. (2008) find non-partisan EMBs to strengthen electoral integrity, but Hartlyn et al. (2008) also find a positive, though weaker, effect of EMBs with a balanced representation of political parties.

Another important aspect of personnel independence is the term length of EMB members and whether EMB members can be reappointed. EMB members with longer terms may be more impartial, especially if their tenure lasts longer than the sitting government (Hartlyn et al., 2008; van Aaken, 2009). In addition, terms that can be renewed may weaken personnel independence. Hence, we hypothesize that having EMB members with longer and more secure tenure will increase the independence of the EMB.

A final aspect of personnel independence are the legal provisions for dismissing EMB members. Here, the grounds on which EMB members can be removed and who can remove them are important, as well as protections against arbitrary removal. We hypothesize that EMB members’ constitutional or legal protection from removal by either the executive or legislative will strengthen formal EMB independence.⁶

Financial independence

Financial independence refers to the EMB budget, how it is allocated and by whom, and the degree to which EMBs have control over their own budgets. Following Gilardi and Maggetti (2011), we also include EMB control over their internal organization, or the extent to which an EMB is free to organize its own internal structure and hire and fire its own staff.

In a governmental model, the EMB budget and expenditures come from a larger pool of funds within a specific ministry. However, within independent and mixed models, budgets may be allocated by a variety of sources, including the legislature, or a government department. The EMB itself may be autonomous in its control of expenditures, or there may be influence of other bodies as to how the EMB allocates funds. Consideration of allocation of budgets and control of expenditures are key indicators of financial independence. Financial independence will provide EMBs with more autonomy in choosing priorities in allocating funds and will allow them the freedom to operate without concern of being ‘starved’ by a displeased government. In addition, EMB control over their internal organization and staff policy will prevent governments from ‘stacking’ the EMB with partisan loyal supporters.

Functional independence

Finally, functional independence refers to the scope of competences or formal powers that are delegated to the EMB. It is often assumed that more competences or a broader mandate for EMBs translates into a higher degree of formal independence (Trebilcock and Chitalkar, 2009; van Aaken, 2009). However, EMBs with a broader mandate may also be more attractive targets for political

actors seeking to engage in electoral manipulation (Hanretty and Koop, 2013). We therefore remain agnostic as to the impact of functional independence on de facto EMB independence.

In the next sections, we map the differences in EMB de jure independence along these four dimensions and analyse how variation in de jure EMB independence affects de facto EMB independence. Before doing so, however, we briefly discuss our data and methods.

Data and methods

This article employs new data from a global survey of EMBs to quantify the dimensions of EMB de jure independence. The Electoral Management Survey (EMS) was conducted between July 2016 and October 2017.⁷ It consists of two parts: a structural survey filled out by one senior EMB official in each EMB surveyed, and a personnel survey sent to EMB employees. The EMS initially focused on Europe, while a sister survey implemented by the Electoral Integrity Project (ELECT) was disseminated to non-European countries (Norris et al., 2016). In the first half of 2017, the countries that had not responded to either the EMS or the ELECT survey were contacted again. Effort was made to contact all bodies that perform any of the major functions of EMBs, as defined by the International IDEA Handbook on Electoral Management Design (Wall et al., 2006).⁸

The structural survey received responses from 78 organizations in 72 countries. In countries where multiple organizations filled out the survey, we selected the primary EMB, that is, the EMB responsible for national-level strategic policy decisions rather than EMBs responsible for implementation.⁹ While there must be some caution in generalizing from the organizations that chose to respond – a common problem in any survey methodology – the 72 countries in our sample span a variety of levels of democratic and economic development and contain both governmental and independent EMBs.¹⁰

To analyse the variation in dimensions of de jure EMB independence in our sample, we use multiple indicators on institutional, personnel, financial and functional independence from the structural survey, which we detail in the next section. To subsequently analyse the impact of EMB de jure independence on EMB de facto independence, we use measures on EMB de facto independence from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem, version 8.0, Coppedge et al., 2018) and Perceptions of Electoral Integrity datasets (PEI, version 6.0, Norris et al., 2018).¹¹ We include data on EMB capacity, economic development, and region as control variables, also derived from the V-Dem and PEI datasets.

We use multivariate ordinary least squares regression to analyse the impact of EMB de jure independence on EMB de facto independence. As our sample provides limited degrees of freedom, we use a stepwise procedure, analysing bivariate relationships first, and only entering significant variables into the full models. Results of models using V-Dem data are reported in the article, and results of models using PEI data as robustness check are available on the Electoral Management Network website.

Variation in EMB de jure independence

Institutional independence


The survey includes two items that measure institutional independence. Considering their formal model, 72% of EMBs in our sample indicate they are independent from government, while 21% indicate they are situated within a government department.¹² This reflects the global shift towards independent model EMBs (Catt et al., 2014; Wall et al., 2006).

The survey also asked about oversight and accountability of EMBs. Of the EMBs in our sample, 43% reported oversight by the legislature, 26% by the executive, 22% by the judiciary or electoral court, 21% by civil society, 15% by political parties and 6% by the civil service. Hence while oversight by the legislature is most common, there is a striking variety of actors involved in the oversight of EMBs. The *number* of oversight actors also varies: in about 51% oversight is carried out by a single actor, in 29% by two, and in 20% by three to five actors.

Personnel independence

To gauge personnel independence, the survey asked about appointment procedures, terms and protections against arbitrary removal. Who appoints the EMB chair varies quite markedly, with appointments by the executive and the legislature being most common, but EMB members, courts, independent bodies, or political parties may also be involved (Figure 1). Appointment of EMB members also varies, though appointment by the executive is most common (Figure 1).


Figure 1. Chair and member appointments.



Considering selection criteria, EMB chairs are most often selected on the basis of professional qualifications (65%) and to a much lesser extent on the basis of a mix of professional qualifications and party status (11%), and only rarely based on party status. EMB members, however, while also most often selected on the basis of professional qualifications (57%), may also be selected on the basis of a mix of professional qualifications and party status (17%), or based on party status alone (7%).

In most cases EMB chairs and members have limited terms (81% and 78% respectively). If EMB chairs have limited terms, these terms last between one and 10 years, with terms between four and six years being most common. Terms of EMB members vary between three and nine years, with terms between four and six years being most common. In only 11% and 10% of cases respectively (EMB chair/members), appointment is permanent. However, in those cases where

Figure 2. Terms of EMB chairs and members.



appointments are not permanent, 15% and 22% of EMBs respectively indicate that terms of chairs and members can be renewed without limit, and in another 15% and 17% of cases terms of chairs and members can be renewed up to five times (Figure 2). In 17% of EMBs no renewal of terms is possible for chairs (10% for members), and in the remaining EMBs terms can be renewed between one and four times.

Regarding protection from arbitrary removal, 67% of EMB chairs and 65% of EMB members are legally protected from removal. The actors that decide on removal of the EMB chair or members in case of misconduct are most often the executive (35% and 36% respectively), the legislature (25% and 22% respectively) and the courts (18% for both). In only few cases are the civil service, civil society or political parties involved.


Finally, regarding provisions about compatibility with other public offices, the survey asked whether EMB chairs and members could be political party members. Here, 56% of EMBs indicated that EMB chairs could be members of a political party (43% for EMB members) and 31% indicated EMB chairs could not (38% for EMB members).

Financial independence

The survey also asked about the sources of EMB funding and which actors are involved in budgetary approval (Figure 3). The greatest source of funding for EMBs is the national government (81%). However, other bodies also provide funds for running elections, including local (7%) and regional government (6%). International organizations also provide funds for EMBs quite regularly. It is surprising to also see the presence of business, private donors and foreign governments, even if only a limited number of EMBs reported receiving funding from these sources.¹³

The actors involved in approving EMB budgets and how they allocate their funds is also important for EMB independence. EMB budget approval is most commonly carried out by the legislature (61%); however, the executive is also often involved (42%). Clearly, while there is a shift towards the formally independent model of electoral governance, the executive still retains power in the budgetary decisions of many EMBs.


Figure 3. Funding sources.



Functional independence

While the division of tasks in the electoral process and the roles and responsibilities of EMBs remains a separate area of study (Garnett, 2018), the survey asked EMBs to identify whether their organization had four key areas of responsibility (Figure 4). First, they were asked whether they could order a recount of results – an important competence in scenarios where issues of electoral malpractice or technical incompetence are suspected; 61% of EMBs reported having this power. Furthermore, 53% of EMBs reported having the power to order re-polling in particular polling stations, and 42% of EMBs to completely annul an election. Only 29% of EMBs have the power to call elections.

Figure 4. EMB powers.



The link between EMB de jure independence and EMB de facto independence

In this section we explore whether there is a link between the four dimensions of EMB de jure independence and EMB de facto independence.

Institutional independence

Table 2 reports the results of the analysis of the effects of institutional independence on de facto EMB autonomy.¹⁴ The first model indicates that formal independence from government does not significantly affect de facto EMB independence, while formally governmental EMBs do, supporting our argument for the need for more detailed analysis of EMB institutional design. The second model investigates whether the type of actor involved in EMB oversight affects de facto EMB independence. The only significant finding here is that oversight by political parties undermines de facto EMB independence. Our expectation that oversight by actors further removed from politics would have a *positive* effect on EMB de facto independence is not confirmed. In Model 3, oversight by multiple actors appears to negatively affect de facto EMB independence, contrary to our expectations.

Table 2. Formal institutional independence and de facto EMB independence.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
EMB fully independent	0.283 (0.583)		
EMB within government	1.161+ (0.642)		
Oversight EMB:			
Executive		-0.135 (0.353)	
Legislature		0.087 (0.289)	
Judiciary		-0.549 (0.378)	
Civil service		0.469 (0.612)	
Civil society		0.072 (0.376)	
Political parties		-0.858+ (0.455)	
Oversight EMB multiple actors?			
Oversight 1			0.150 (0.366)
Oversight 2			0.223 (0.412)
Oversight 3-5			-0.889+ (0.460)
Constant	1.107+ (0.561)	1.761*** (0.242)	1.571*** (0.291)
N	66	66	66
R-squared	0.099	0.134	0.104

Standard errors in parentheses. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001.

Personnel independence

Turning to personnel independence, Table 3 shows the results for EMB chairs.¹⁵ Model 1 shows that if chairs are appointed by the executive, de facto EMB independence is significantly lower, as expected. Surprisingly, de facto EMB independence is also lower if chairs are appointed by EMB members. The number of appointing actors appears to have a negative effect: the more actors involved in appointing the chair, the lower de facto EMB independence. This runs counter to our expectation that the involvement of more actors would generate more checks on appointments and result in more independent EMBs. However, an increase in the number of appointing actors may also mean a higher likelihood of the involvement of actors such as the executive, which has a negative impact on de facto independence. Turning to the basis of appointment in Model 3, as expected, chairs appointed on the basis of professional qualifications positively affect de facto EMB independence, but the effect is not significant.

With regard to terms, we created a scale indicating whether chairs had permanent terms, limited terms that were renewable without limit, limited terms that were renewable many times, or limited terms that were not renewable. The resulting variable thus indicates security of tenure for chairs and varies from the most secure to the least secure terms. As expected, we find chairs with less secure tenure to be associated with lower de facto EMB independence (Model 4).

Protections against arbitrary removal should also strengthen de facto EMB independence, but we find no significant effect (Model 5). There are also no significant effects for which actor(s) can remove chairs in case of misconduct (Model 6). Finally, if chairs can be members of political parties, this significantly undermines de facto EMB independence.

Table 3. Personnel independence and de facto EMB independence.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Who appoints EMB chair?							
Legislature	-0.333 (0.353)						
Executive	-0.644+ (0.350)						
Independent body	-0.605 (0.654)						
EMB members	-0.832+ (0.416)						
Courts	-0.410 (0.477)						
Political parties	-0.720 (0.738)						
Appointment multiple actors? (0-4)		-0.543+ (0.281)					
Appointment professional? (0-1)			0.257 (0.301)				
Terms chair (1-5)				-0.210* (0.080)			

Table 3. (Continued)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Protection arbitrary removal?					-0.091		
					(0.306)		
Who removes EMB chair?							
Executive						-0.122	
						(0.341)	
Legislature						-0.341	
						(0.361)	
Judiciary						0.070	
						(0.462)	
Civil service						1.398	
						(1.216)	
Civil society						-0.252	
						(0.879)	
Political parties						1.014	
						(1.526)	
Chair party member?							-0.748**
							(0.275)
Constant	2.138***	2.171***	1.378***	2.124***	1.606***	1.642***	1.965***
	(0.299)	(0.353)	(0.243)	(0.259)	(0.250)	(0.260)	(0.206)
N	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
R-squared	0.100	0.055	0.011	0.098	0.001	0.055	0.103

Standard errors in parentheses. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001.

Financial independence

Table 4 shows that who approves the EMB budget does not significantly affect de facto EMB independence. Budget approval by the executive does have a negative sign, as expected, but is not significant. Turning to the number of actors involved, having more actors involved in EMB budget approval strengthens de facto independence, but this effect is also not significant.

Since data on the sources of EMB funding were non-normally distributed, we recoded variables to range from rarely/never/not applicable, to occasionally, to on a regular basis/often. The source of funding for EMBs does appear to be correlated with de facto EMB independence. While governmental funding (national and local/regional) is positively related to EMB independence, non-governmental sources appear to relate negatively to EMB independence. However, only funding by international organizations is found to be significant. These results may highlight that international organizations involved in democracy assistance tend to assist EMBs where challenges to electoral integrity are more common, but they nevertheless underscore the importance of better understanding external influences on EMB independence.

Table 4. Financial independence and de facto EMB independence.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Who approves EMB budget?			
Executive	-0.191 (0.343)		
Legislature	0.163 (0.338)		
Judiciary	1.604 (1.177)		
Civil service	1.077 (0.850)		
Civil society	0.423 (0.850)		
Political parties	1.443 (1.202)		
Budget approved multiple actors? (0–3)		0.248 (0.254)	
Sources EMB funding?			
National government			0.083 (0.189)
Regional and local government			0.124 (0.289)
Civil society organizations			-0.358 (0.420)
Private donors (philanthropists)			-0.688 (0.452)
Private donors (corporations)			-0.220 (0.527)
International organizations			-0.456+ (0.244)
Foreign government(s)			-0.305 (0.294)
Constant	1.426*** (0.342)	1.268*** (0.319)	1.701*** (0.322)
N	66	66	66
R-squared	0.099	0.015	0.182

Standard errors in parentheses. *P*-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001.

Functional independence

Finally, Table 5 evaluates the impact of functional independence on de facto EMB independence. EMBs that can order recounting, re-polling or even annul an election appear to be less likely to function independently in practice. However, these effects are not significant. When taking the four competences together, we find the more cumulative power the EMB has, the less likely it is to be de facto independent. Contrary to expectations that more cumulative power might increase EMB independence, this suggests that EMBs with more extensive powers could in fact be a more attractive target for actors seeking to manipulate elections.

Table 5. Functional independence and de facto EMB independence.

	Model 1	Model 2
EMB power to:		
Call elections	-0.187 (0.342)	
Order recount of results	-0.356 (0.388)	
Order re-polling	-0.049 (0.418)	
Completely annul election	-0.088 (0.390)	
Count of powers (0–4)		-0.164+ (0.095)
Constant	1.879*** (0.238)	1.854*** (0.227)
N	66	66
R-squared	0.049	0.045

Standard errors in parentheses. *P*-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001.

Dimensions of independence together

To evaluate how institutional, personnel, financial and functional independence affect de facto EMB independence conjointly, we analyse the impact of those variables that were significant in Tables 2–5 together (Table 6).

Table 6. De jure independence, de facto independence and election integrity.

	EMB autonomy	EMB autonomy	Election integrity	Election integrity
<i>EMB de facto independence</i>			0.740*** (0.055)	0.689*** (0.064)
<i>Institutional independence</i>				
EMB within government	1.172+ (0.610)	0.657 (0.538)	-0.082 (0.251)	-0.114 (0.244)
Oversight EMB political parties	-0.820+ (0.485)	-1.390** (0.437)	-0.071 (0.201)	-0.243 (0.215)
Oversight EMB multiple actors? (0–3)	0.039 (0.188)	0.224 (0.165)	0.025 (0.075)	0.070 (0.075)
<i>Personnel independence</i>				
Who appoints EMB chair?				
Executive	-0.168 (0.304)	-0.010 (0.279)	0.005 (0.125)	0.007 (0.125)
EMB members	-0.249 (0.349)	-0.094 (0.298)	0.017 (0.140)	0.037 (0.133)
Appointment multiple actors? (0–4)	-0.370 (0.279)	-0.250 (0.241)	-0.139 (0.113)	-0.118 (0.109)

(Continued)

Table 6. (Continued)

	EMB autonomy	EMB autonomy	Election integrity	Election integrity
Terms chair (1–5)	-0.159+ (0.083)	0.006 (0.086)	-0.008 (0.034)	0.005 (0.038)
Chair party member?	-0.445 (0.312)	0.210 (0.297)	-0.236+ (0.128)	-0.130 (0.133)
<i>Financial independence</i>				
Sources EMB funding?				
International organizations	-0.485* (0.219)	0.310 (0.260)	-0.187+ (0.095)	-0.104 (0.118)
<i>Functional independence</i>				
Count of powers (0–4)	0.089 (0.102)	-0.081 (0.096)	-0.000 (0.041)	-0.035 (0.043)
Constant	2.023** (0.642)	0.031 (0.826)	0.276 (0.279)	0.069 (0.369)
Controls ^a	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	66	65	65	65
R-squared	0.389	0.621	0.885	0.909

Standard errors in parentheses. *P*-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. a. Models with controls include EMB capacity, economic development and regional dummies.

The first model demonstrates that when all institutional variables are considered together, very few remain significant. Within the dimension of institutional independence, EMB oversight by political parties and formally governmental EMBs remain significant. Considering personnel independence, the only indicator that remains significant is EMB chair terms, with less secure tenure of EMB chairs undermining EMB de facto independence. The EMB chair being allowed to be a party member is close to one-tailed significance. Regarding financial independence, EMB funding by international organizations remains negative and significant. Finally, functional independence is no longer significant once the other dimensions of EMB de jure independence are taken into account. However, adding control variables in the second model leaves only EMB oversight by political parties significant, underscoring the importance of contextual factors such as EMB capacity and economic development for EMBs' ability to operate independently in practice.

The third and fourth models in Table 6 analyse the extent to which de facto EMB independence affects electoral integrity. We also test whether the dimensions of EMB de jure independence affect electoral integrity directly. Models 3 and 4 show how important de facto EMB independence is for electoral integrity: EMBs that are able to operate autonomously in practice strongly boost electoral integrity. As expected, EMB de jure independence does not directly affect electoral integrity, but rather works through EMB de facto independence. The only direct effects of EMB de jure independence that remain are the negative effect of chairs being allowed party membership and EMBs receiving funding by international organizations (model 3), but neither of these remain significant once control variables are included (model 4).

Conclusion

To conclude, we return to the three questions asked in the introduction to this article. First, what factors in EMB institutional design shape EMB de jure independence, and how do these vary

across EMBs? We identify four dimensions of formal EMB independence: institutional, personnel, financial and functional. Mapping these dimensions of de jure EMB independence around the world, using data from a new survey of EMBs conducted in 72 countries between 2016 and 2017, we show the variety in EMB institutional design that exists, beyond the simple tri-classification of EMBs as independent, governmental or mixed.

The next goal of this article was to uncover how variations in de jure independence affect EMB de facto independence. We demonstrate that some dimensions of de jure independence indeed shape de facto independence when bivariate relationships are tested. The results of these tests suggest that political party involvement in EMB oversight, appointment of EMB chairs by partisan actors, less secure terms and rules allowing for party membership of EMB chairs, significantly undermine de facto EMB independence. In addition, a surprising finding was the importance of sources of EMB funding for de facto EMB independence. The negative effects of international organization funding to EMBs, and the presence of foreign governments and private donors in EMB funding, calls for further research into how electoral management autonomy is affected by influence from external actors. However, despite these interesting bivariate findings, most of these effects are no longer significant when all four dimensions of institutional, personnel, financial and functional independence are included in a joint model, or when control variables are included. This suggests that de jure independence is only weakly related to de facto independence.

The final question addressed in this article was whether de jure and de facto independence affect electoral integrity more generally. The results here demonstrate a very strong and positive impact of de facto EMB independence on electoral integrity and, as expected, very few direct effects of de jure EMB independence on electoral integrity. This underscores our proposition that de jure EMB independence should affect electoral integrity through enhancing de facto EMB independence.

What are the implications of these findings? First, the extent to which EMBs are able to operate independently in practice is crucial for their capacity to deliver elections of high integrity. Second, while institutional engineering may have some role to play in achieving EMBs that operate independently in practice, the effects of de jure EMB independence on de facto EMB independence are relatively weak, and hence changes in EMB institutional design should probably be considered as only one of multiple interventions to strengthen de facto EMB independence. Mitigating factors such as bureaucratic culture and levels of corruption in a country may shape the context in which the election takes place and have stronger influence on the degree to which EMBs operate independently than its formal institutional set-up. Hence, targeting those factors may also help to strengthen de facto EMB independence.

However, it is still possible that EMB institutional design *can* have a strong impact on de facto EMB independence in certain contexts. Our sample included a wide range of countries at different levels of development and democracy, and while including control variables that captured this variation, the sample was not large enough to investigate interaction effects that could highlight the role of EMB institutional design in poor versus wealthy democracies, or in transitioning versus established democracies. Further research using a larger sample of countries worldwide is therefore needed, both to corroborate the findings presented here, as well as to disentangle the impact of variation in contextual conditions on the link between de jure and de facto EMB independence, and ultimately electoral integrity. Doing so may demonstrate in which contexts which institutional design features have an impact on EMB independence and electoral integrity. Hence, one-size-fits-all solutions for institutional engineering are unlikely to be effective, but more tailored interventions may prove to be key in building impartial electoral management, enabling EMBs to deliver clean elections.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank participants at the workshop on *Building Better Elections*, at the 11th ECPR General Conference, Oslo 6–9 September 2017, and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback on earlier versions of this article. The usual disclaimer applies and any remaining errors are our own.

Funding

This research project was supported by the Australian Research Council DECRA funding awarded to Dr Carolien van Ham [grant number DE150101692]. The Electoral Management Survey referenced in this article was funded by the Electoral Integrity Project, the University of East Anglia, and the University of New South Wales.

ORCID iDs

Carolien van Ham  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9844-9097>

Holly Ann Garnett  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2119-4399>

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online at: www.electoralmanagement.com. and at journals.sagepub.com/home/ips.

Notes

1. Following Hanretty and Koop (2013: 196), we define *formal* or *de jure* independence as ‘the degree of independence from politics inherent in the legal instruments that constitute and govern the agency’ and *de facto* independence as ‘the degree to which the agency operates independently from politics in practice’.
2. As Mozaffar and Schedler (2002: 15) note, ‘how formal rules translate into actual practice’ may only be ‘loosely coupled’. ‘We should see institutions that are independent on paper, but intimidated, colonized, or neutralized in practice by governmental authorities. And we should see electoral authorities acting independently despite their formal subordination to government agencies.’
3. Please note that this, of course, represents a simplified causal chain, representing our key variables of interest in this article. The introduction to this special issue sets out the full model.
4. These indicators match to a large extent the operationalization of formal independence developed for independent regulatory agencies by Gilardi and Maggetti (2011: 203).
5. Accountability for the implementation of the EMB mandate includes both a reporting and a justification requirement (Schedler, 1999).
6. Note that legal protections against arbitrary removal can in practice be overridden by changing the law(s) governing the EMB, as happened in Timor-Leste in 2016.
7. For more details on the Electoral Management Survey, see the introduction to this special issue.
8. A full list of countries and EMBs is available in the online appendix to this article. In total, 177 countries that held elections between 2012 and 2017, and that were not microstates (population < 100,000), were identified. EMB contact information was missing for 21 countries. A total of 156 countries were contacted and 72 countries responded, resulting in a response rate of 46%.
9. These were: in Hungary, the National Election Commission; in the Kyrgyz Republic, the Central Commission for Election and Referendums; in the Netherlands, the National Election Council; in Norway, the Norwegian Directorate of Elections; and in Spain, the Central Electoral Board. Please note that in Spain, three organizations responded.
10. Specifically, our sample includes 13% not free, 30% partly free, and 58% free countries; 14% low income, 18% lower-middle income, 31% upper-middle income, and 37% high income countries; and countries from Africa (19%), the Americas (17%), Asia (25%), and Europe (39%).
11. Both measures are based on country expert evaluations of how independent EMBs are in practice. Extensive validity checks of V-Dem and EIP data suggest the data are high quality (Pemstein et al., 2018, Martinez i Coma and van Ham, 2015). For more details on question wording and data, see Coppedge et al., 2018 and Norris et al., 2018.

12. In this analysis, countries that responded ‘other’ or are missing are included in the percentage total but not reported specifically. Hence, $N = 72$ for all proportions reported here.
13. It was not possible from the budgetary data provided by EMBs to accurately measure the amount or proportion of funds provided by these organizations.
14. Note that the number of cases drops to 66 due to missing data in the V-Dem variables.
15. For reasons of parsimony, we only include EMB chair variables. Results for EMB member variables are available from the authors.

References

- Alvarez, R Michael, Lonna Rae Atkeson and Thad E Hall (2012) *Evaluating Elections: A Handbook of Methods and Standards*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Alvarez, R Michael, Thad Hall and Morgan Llewellyn (2008) Are Americans Confident Their Ballots Are Counted? *The Journal of Politics* 70(3): 754–766.
- Birch, Sarah (2011) *Electoral Malpractice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Birch, Sarah and Carolien van Ham (2017) Getting Away with Foul Play? The importance of formal and informal oversight institutions for electoral integrity. *European Journal of Political Research* 56(3): 487–511.
- Bowler, Shaun, Thomas Brunell, Todd Donovan and Paul Gronke (2015) Election Administration and Perceptions of Fair Elections. *Electoral Studies* 38: 1–9.
- Buckley, Fiona and Theresa Reidy (2015) Managing the Electoral Process: Insights from, and for, Ireland. *Irish Political Studies* 30(4): 445–453.
- Catt, Helena, Andrew Ellis, Michael Maley, Alan Wall and Peter Wolf (2014) *Electoral Management Design*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
- Clark, Alistair (2015) Public Administration and the Integrity of the Electoral Process in British Elections. *Public Administration* 93(1): 86–102.
- Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Luehrmann, Kyle L Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtrom, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig and Daniel Ziblatt (2018) *V-Dem Codebook v8. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project*. <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-8/>
- Elklit, Jørgen and Andrew Reynolds (2001) Analysing the Impact of Election Administration on Democratic Politics. *Representation* 38(1): 3–10.
- Elklit, Jørgen and Andrew Reynolds (2005) Judging Elections and Election Management Quality by Process. *Representation* 41(3): 189–207.
- Estévez, Federico, Eric Magar and Guillermo Rosas (2008) Partisanship in Non-Partisan Electoral Agencies and Democratic Compliance: Evidence from Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute. *Electoral Studies* 27(2): 257–271.
- Fall, Ismaila Madior, Mathias Hounkpe, Adele L Jinadu and Pascal Kambal (2011) *Election Management Bodies in West Africa: A Comparative Study of the Contribution of Electoral Commissions to the Strengthening of Democracy*. Cape Town: African Minds.
- Farrell, David M (2015) Conclusion and Reflection: Time for an electoral commission for Ireland. *Irish Political Studies* 30(4): 641–646.
- Garnett, Holly Ann (2018) *Who Runs Elections? Election Management Body Roles and Responsibilities in Comparative Perspectives*, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA.
- Gazibo, Mamoudou (2006) The Forging of Institutional Autonomy: A comparative study of electoral management commissions in Africa. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 39(3): 611–633.
- Gilardi, Fabrizio and Martino Maggetti (2011) The Independence of Regulatory Authorities. In David Levi-Faur (ed.) *Handbook on the Politics of Regulation*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 201–214.
- Hanretty, Chris and Christel Koop (2013) Shall the Law Set Them Free? The formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies. *Regulation & Governance* 7(2): 195–214.

- Hartlyn, Jonathan, Jennifer McCoy and Thomas M Mustillo (2008) Electoral Governance Matters: Explaining the quality of elections in contemporary Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies* 41(1): 73–98.
- Herron, Erik S, Nazar Boyko and Michael E Thunberg (2017) Serving Two Masters: Professionalization versus corruption in Ukraine’s Election Administration. *Governance* 30(4): 601–619.
- James, Toby S (2017) The Effects of Centralising Electoral Management Board Design. *Policy Studies* 38(2): 130–148.
- Kerr, Nicholas (2014) EMB Performance and African Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. In Pippa Norris, Richard W Frank and Ferran Martínez i Coma (eds) *Advancing Electoral Integrity*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lehoucq, F (2003) Electoral Fraud: Causes, types, and consequences. *Annual Review of Political Science* 6: 233–256.
- López-Pintor, Rafael (2000) *Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of Governance*. New York: Bureau for Development Policy, United Nations Development Programme.
- Martínez i Coma, Ferran and Carolien van Ham (2015). Can experts judge elections? Testing the validity of expert judgments for measuring election integrity. *European Journal of Political Research* 54(2): 305–325.
- Mozaffar, Shaheen (2002) Patterns of Electoral Governance in Africa’s Emerging Democracies. *International Political Science Review* 23(1): 85–101.
- Mozaffar, Shaheen and Andreas Schedler (2002) The Comparative Study of Electoral Governance - Introduction. *International Political Science Review* 23(2): 5–27.
- Norris, Pippa (2015) *Why Elections Fail*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, Pippa, Alessandro Nai and Jeffrey Karp (2016) Electoral Learning and Capacity Building (ELECT) Dataset. doi: 10.7910/DVN/MQCI3U. <https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/data/>
- Norris, Pippa, Thomas Wynter and Sarah Cameron (2018) Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI-6.0) Dataset, doi:10.7910/DVN/Q6UBTH. <https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/data/>
- Otaola, Miguel Lara (2017) To Include or not to Include? Party representation in electoral institutions and confidence in elections: A comparative study of Latin America. *Party Politics* 24(5): 598–608.
- Pastor, Robert A (1999) The Role of Electoral Administration in Democratic Transitions: Implications for policy and research. *Democratization* 6(4): 1–27.
- Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Joshua Krusell and Farhad Miri. 2018. “The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data”. University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy Institute: Working Paper No. 21, 3d edition.
- Rosas, Guillermo (2010) Trust in Elections and the Institutional Design of Electoral Authorities: Evidence from Latin America. *Electoral Studies* 29(1): 74–90.
- Schedler, A (2002) The Menu of Manipulation. *Journal of Democracy* 13(2): 36–50.
- Trebilcock, Michael and Poorvi Chitalkar (2009) From Nominal to Substantive Democracy: The Role and Design of Election Management Bodies. *The Law and Development Review* 2(1): 192–224.
- Ugues Jr, Antonio (2014) Electoral Management in Central America. In Pippa Norris, Richard W Frank and Ferran Martínez i Coma (eds) *Advancing Electoral Integrity*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- van Aaken, Anne (2009) Independent Electoral Management Bodies and International Election Observer Missions: Any impact on the observed level of democracy? A conceptual framework. *Constitutional Political Economy* 20(3): 296–322.
- van Ham, Carolien and Staffan Lindberg (2015) When Guardians Matter Most: Exploring the conditions under which electoral management body institutional design affects election integrity. *Irish Political Studies* 30(4): 454–481.
- Wall, Alan, Andrew Ellis, Ayman Ayoub, Carl W Dundas, Joram Rukambe and Sara Staino (2006) *Electoral Management Design*. The International IDEA Handbook Series. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Author biographies

Carolien van Ham is Professor of Empirical Political Science, Radboud University, The Netherlands, and an ARC Discovery Early Career Research Award recipient (2015–2017). Her research focuses on democratization and authoritarianism, election integrity, and legitimacy and political representation.

Holly Ann Garnett is assistant professor of political science at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Canada. She is a co-convenor of the Electoral Management Network. Her research examines how electoral integrity can be strengthened throughout the electoral cycle, including the role of election management bodies, voter registration, convenience voting measures, election technologies, civic literacy and campaign finance.

Appendix. Organizations and countries studied.

COUNTRY	PARTICIPATING EMB (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)	SURVEYED BY:
AFGHANISTAN	Independent Election Commission	ELECT
ALBANIA	Central Election Commission	EMS
ARGENTINA	National Electoral Directorate	ELECT
BAHAMAS, THE	Parliamentary Registration Department	ELECT
BELARUS	Central Commission for Elections and Conduct of Republican Referendums	EMS
BELGIUM	Federal Public Service – Directorate General Institutions and Population – Service Elections	EMS
BHUTAN	Election Commission of Bhutan	ELECT
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	Central Election Commission	EMS
BULGARIA	Central Election Commission	EMS
BURKINA FASO	Independent National Electoral Commission	EMS
CAMBODIA	National Election Committee	ELECT
CANADA	Elections Canada	ELECT
COSTA RICA	Supreme Court of Elections	ELECT
COTE D'IVOIRE	Independent Electoral Commission	ELECT
CROATIA	State Election Commission	EMS
CZECH REPUBLIC	Statistical Office	EMS
DENMARK	Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Interior	EMS
DOMINICA	Electoral Office	ELECT
ECUADOR	Contentious Electoral Court	EMS
ESTONIA	National Electoral Committee	EMS
FINLAND	Ministry of Justice	EMS
GHANA	Electoral Commission	ELECT
GREECE	Ministry of the Environment/Election Directorate	EMS
GUAM	Election Commission	ELECT
GUINEA	Independent National Electoral Commission	ELECT
HUNGARY	National Election Commission	EMS
IRELAND	Department of Housing, Planning, Community and Local Government	EMS
INDONESIA	Election Commission for West Java Province	ELECT
IRAQ	Independent High Electoral Commission	ELECT
ISRAEL	Central Elections Committee	EMS
JORDAN	Independent Electoral Commission	EMS

(Continued)

Appendix (Continued)

COUNTRY	PARTICIPATING EMB (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)	SURVEYED BY:
KENYA	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission	ELECT
KOREA, REP.	National Election Commission	ELECT
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC	Central Commission for Election and Referendums	EMS
LATVIA	Central Election Commission	EMS
LUXEMBOURG	Government Centralizing Office	EMS
MALAWI	Electoral Commission	ELECT
MALDIVES	Elections Commission	ELECT
MALTA	Electoral Commission	EMS
MAURITIUS	Office of the Electoral Commissioner	EMS
MEXICO	National Electoral Institute	ELECT
MOLDOVA	Central Electoral Commission	EMS
MONGOLIA	General Election Commission	ELECT
MOZAMBIQUE	National Commission of Elections	ELECT
NETHERLANDS	National Electoral Council	EMS
NEW ZEALAND	Electoral Commission	ELECT
NORWAY	Directorate of Elections	EMS
PALESTINE	Central Elections Commission	ELECT
PANAMA	Tribunal Electoral	ELECT
PERU	National Election Jury	ELECT
PHILIPPINES	Commission on Elections	EMS
POLAND	State Electoral Commission, National Electoral Office	EMS
ROMANIA	Permanent Electoral Authority	EMS
RUSSIAN FEDERATION	Central Election Commission	EMS
RWANDA	National Electoral Commission	ELECT
SAMOA	Office of the Electoral Commissioner	ELECT
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	TElect-STP	ELECT
SENEGAL	National Election Commission	ELECT
SIERRA LEONE	National Electoral Commission	ELECT
SLOVAK REPUBLIC	State Commission on Election and Control of Funding of Political Parties	EMS
SPAIN	Central Electoral Board	EMS
ST LUCIA	Saint Lucia Electoral Department	EMS
SURINAME	Independent Electoral Council	ELECT
SWEDEN	Election Authority	EMS
SWITZERLAND	Federal Chancellery, Political Rights Section	EMS
TAIWAN	Central Election Commission	EMS
TANZANIA	National Electoral Commission	ELECT
THAILAND	Election Commission	ELECT
TIMOR-LESTE	National Election Commission	EMS
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	Elections & Boundaries Commission	EMS
TURKEY	Higher Elections Committee	EMS
ZIMBABWE	Electoral Commission	ELECT